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CASE COMMENTS

the fact that no comparable federal statute exists to permit federal
courts to retry a defendant for a greater offense when there has been
substantial legal error in the first trial, it would appear that reasoning
analogous to that of Palko might have been used in the principal case
when the accused obtained a reversal of an erroneous lesser conviction, which, while unappealed, clearly operated as a benefit to him.
When the defendant elected to appeal his beneficial lesser conviction, a
retrial for the greater offense would not appear to deprive the accused
of any constitutionally protected right. By such a judicial interpretation of the fifth amendment, the defendant's safeguard against a government appeal would still be preserved in the federal courts.
Although the maxim of double jeopardy is based upon the principle
of finality of judicial proceedings, the function of courts is to settle
controversies according to law. It is imperative, therefore, that when
jeopardy is involved, it must be a real and continuing jeopardy through
every stage of the prosecution. With such a requirement the double
jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment would serve its true purpose
and would thereby effectuate and perpetuate the intent of its framers.
OwEN A. NEFF

THE TIME TO WHICH WORDS OF SURVIVORSHIP
IN A WILL REFER
The question frequently arises in the construction of a will as to
whether words of survivorship relate to the death of the testator or of
the life tenant. Thus, if A devises property to B for life with remainder
to the surviving children of B, it is clear that B's children must survive
some point of time. But whether the takers need only survive A or
whether they must also survive some other period of time, such as the
death of the life tenant B, is a problem of construction to be faced by
the courts. If the construction adopted is that B's children must survive
A, the remainder interest vests in the children immediately upon the
death of A. If the takers must survive the life tenant B, however, the
remainder is contingent, and surviving the life tenant is a condition
precedent to the vesting of the estate.
Some courts in the United States follow the early English rule
principal case: "At the present time in this country there is more danger that
criminals will escape justice than that they will be subjected to tyranny." Kepner
v. United States, 195 U.S. 1oo, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion).
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that survivorship is referable to the time of the testator's death.'
Various reasons are given in support of this rule. Such a construction
precludes the possibility of a state of intestacy resulting from the contingent nature of the estate. 2 It is also suggested that this rule accords
with the well-settled rule of construction that a remainder will, if
possible, be constructed as vested rather than contigent. 3 Further, this
approach avoids the harsh result of excluding the representatives of
children who predecease the life tenant.4 The rule is also said to
promote equality of distribution. 5
The majority of American jurisdictions, however, have adopted the
rule that words of survivorship presumptively refer to the death of the
life tenant, unless a manifest intent to the contrary is expressed in the
will. 6 It has been pointed out that this interpretation gives the words
7
their natural and ordinary meaning.
1
Crossley v. Leslie, i3o Ga. 782, 61 S.E. 851 (i9o8); Bruce v. Bissell, 119 Ind. 525,
22 N.E. 4 (1889); In re Nass's Estate, 320 Pa. 38o, 182 Ad. 4o (1936); Jameson v.
Major, 86 Va. 51, 9 S.E. 48o (1889). Georgia by statute makes survivorship referable
to the death of the testator. Ga. Code Ann. § 85-708 (1933).
21 n AIsman v. Walters, 184 Ind. 565, i11 N.E. 921 (igi6), where the testator
devised land to his son for life and "after his death to his children surviving him
in fee simple," it was argued that the remainder to each child was contingent
upon such child's surviving the life tenant. In holding that survivorship referred
to the testator's death, the court stated that "partial intestacy is to be avoided unless
the language of the will compels it." Id. at 922. See In re Montgomery Estate, 258
App. Div. 64, 15 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2d Dep't 1939), aff'd without opinion, 282 N.Y. 713, 26
N.E.2d 824 (1940); In re Alhart, 189 Misc. 473, 71 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
3
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Aspy v. Lewis, 152 Ind. 493, 52 N.E. 756
(1899), declared that -the rule of construction referring words of survivorship to
the testator's death rather than to the death of the life tenant is a corollary of the
rule of construction favoring the vesting of estates. In Cottrell v. Mathews, 120 Va.
847, 92 S.E. 8o8 (1917), the testator devised his estate to his wife for life and after
her death to be equally divided among any surviving children. The Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals said that survivorship referred to the death of the
testator and that the result was in accord with the policy of the law that favored
vested rather than contingent remainders.
v. Friederich, 164 Ill.
245, 45 N.E. 498 (1896); Aspy v. Lewis, 152
Ind. 493, 52 N.E. 756 (1899); In re Groninger's Estate, 268 Pa. 184, 11o At. 465
4Grimmer

(1920).

'In re Nass's Estate, 32o Pa. 38o, 182 Atl. 401 (1936). The testator devised
property in trust for his daughters or their issue, and in case of the death of the
daughters without issue, then to the surviving children. The court said that to adopt
any other rule of construction would work an inequality and what was presumably
the testator's scheme would not be carried out.
6
Hurst v. Hilderbrandt, 178 Ark. 337, 1o S.W.2d 491 (1928); In re Winter's Estate,
114 Cal. 186, 45 Pac. 1063 (1896); Hawke v. Lodge, 9 Del. Ch. 146, 77 At. lo9o (1916);
Sutherland v. Green, 191 Iowa 711, 182 N.W. 785 (1921); Ridgely v. Ridgely, 147
Md. 419, 128 Ad. 131 (1925); Welch v. Williams, 237 Mass. 373, 129 N.E. 677 (1921);
Stevens v. Edson, 82 N. J. Eq. lO5 , 87 Ad. 343 (1913)7The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Conveny v. McLaughlin, 148
Mass. 576, 2o N.E. 165 (1889), emphasized the fact that it would be unnecessary to
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The New York courts have often held that words of survivorship
relate to the testator's death.8 There are, however, some decisions which
as a general rule refer survivorship to the time of distribution.0 Where
there is an instruction "to divide and pay over," survivorship is easily
referred to the period of distribution. 10 In the case of a gift to a class,
survivorship has been referred to the termination of the intervening
estate." The fact that the interest of the remainderman will only arise
if the life tenant dies without issue has been held to indicate that the
remainderman must survive the life tenant in order for the estate to
vest in him.' 2 Where the gift in remainder is of personalty, as distinguished from realty, survivorship has been referred to the period
of division and enjoyment.' 3
In the case of In re Gautier's Will, 4 the question was presented to
the New York Court of Appeals as to whether the word "surviving"
referred to the testator's death or to the death of the life beneficiary.
The testator's will directed that half of the residuary estate be divided
into eight shares, four of which were to be held in trust for his sister,
Clara Bird, for life, and at her death in trust for his nephews and
nieces, Oliver Bird, Claire Bird Lewis, Dudley Bird, and Marie Louise
Bird, for their lives. On the death of any of them "the one share held
use the word "surviving" if the testator intended that all those living at the time
of his death would take. In Hall v. Blodgett, 7o N.H. 437, 48 Ad. 1085 (i9o), it
was held that to refer survivorship to the death of the testator would conflict with
the natural meaning of the language used.
8
Stevenson v. Lesley, 7o N.Y. 512 (817); Moore v. Lyons, 25 Wend. 119 (N.Y.
1840); In re Montgomery Estate, 258 App. Div. 64, 15 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2d Dep't 1939),
aff'd without opinion, 282 N.Y. 713, 26 N.E.2d 824 (1940); Runyon v. Grubb, 119
App. Div. 17, 1o3 N.Y. Supp. 949 (2d Dep't 1907), aff'd without opinion, 192 N.Y.
586, 85 N.E. 1115 (1908); In re Alhart, 189 Misc. 473, 71 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Surr. Ct.
1947); In re Rhodes' Estate, 169 Misc. 395, 7 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Surr. Ct. 1938); In re
Woodruff's Will, 135 Misc. 203, 237 N.Y. Supp. 417 (Surr. Ct. 1929); Esslie v. Kraft,
70 Misc. 144, 126 N.Y. Supp. 416 (Sup. Ct. 191o).
0
Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N.Y. 227, 32 N.E. 672 (1892); May v. May, 209
App. Div. 22, 204 N.Y. Supp. 408 (2d Dep't 1924); In re Van Ghele's Estate, 57
N.Y.S.2d 287 (Surr. Ct. 1943); In re Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 82 Misc. 330, 143
N.Y. Supp. 700 (Surr. Ct. 1913).
20In re Buechner, 226 N.Y. 440, 123 N.E. 741 (1919); In re Leonard, 218 N.Y.
513, 113 N.E. 491 (1916); In re Leverich's Will, 125 Misc. 130, 21o N.Y. Supp. 6o5
(Sur. Ct. 1925).

uWhen a gift is made to a class, its benefits are usually confined to those persons within it when distribution is to be made. Teed v. Morton, 6o N.Y. 502 (1875);
Clark v. Grosh, 81 Misc. 407, 142 N.Y. Supp. 966 (Sup. Ct. 1912). See also United
States Trust Co. v. Baker, 51 Misc. 657, 102 N.Y. Supp. 194 (Sup. Ct. 19o6).
2-Truesdale v. Pierce, 152 App. Div. 453, 137 N.Y. Supp. 349 (2d Dep't 1912);
In re Woodruff's Will, 135 Misc. 203, 237 N.Y. Supp. 417 (Sur. Ct 1929).
lqIn re Stocum's Will, 94 N.Y. Supp. 588 (SunT. Ct. 1905); In re Walker's Estate,
39 Misc. 68o, 8o N.Y. Supp. 653 (Sur. Ct. 19o3).
143 N.Y.2d 502, 146 N.E.2d 771 (1957).
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in trust for the one so dying shall cease and the share of such nephew or
niece shall be paid to his or her children, if any, and in the event that
the nephew or niece dies leaving no children the share shall be divided
equally amongst her 1 or her brother and sisters surviving."'16
Clara, the primary life beneficiary, died, and trusts were established
for the benefit of each of her children. After the death of Oliver and
Claire the corpus of the trust set up for them passed to their children.
Marie Louise died without issue, survived only by Dudley. The trustee
brought a bill to obtain a construction of the will.
The Appellate Division determined that the word "surviving"
referred to the death of the testator, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that survivorship referred to the death of the life beneficiary. Since only Dudley survived the childless Marie Louise, he was
said to be entitled to the entire corpus of the trust set up for her
benefit. The court recognized that "the testator's intention as gathered
from the will is, of course, controlling and, in seeking it, we must
give to his words their natural and ordinary meaning."' 17 It was thought
that the testator indicated a clear-cut intention to create a remainder
interest contingent upon survival of the life beneficiary. The opinion
points out that when, in another portion of the will, the testator
wished distribution to depend on mere survival of himself, he said so
explicitly.' s The court announced the following rule of construction:
"Absent language pointing a contrary intention words of survivorship
refer to the time of the testator's death 'only in the case of an absolute
devise or bequest to one and in case of his death to another;' they carry
no such implication where, as in the will under consideration, the first
devisee or legatee takes a life estate."' 9 This rule of construction is
contrary to that announced earlier in New York in the case of Moore
v. Lyons.2o That decision held that words of survivorship in a will
refer to the death of the testator, unless there is special intent manifested
to the contrary. In the Moore case the testator devised his dwelling
house and lot of land to Mary for life, and after her death "to Susan,
Jane, and Betsey, three daughters of said Mary, or to the survivors or
survivor of them, their or her heirs and assigns forever."21 Susan and
5To whom does "her" refer? The court has apparently read the pronoun "her"
as "his." Otherwise there is an ambiguity which cannot be resolved from the will
itself.
m146 N.E.2d at 772.

27Ibid.
'81d. at 773.
"Ibid. This language is taken from Mullarky v. Sullivan, 136 N.Y. 227, 32
N.E. 762, 763 (1892), a case almost identical on its facts with the principal case.
-'25Wend. iig (N.Y. 184o).
"Id. at sig.
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Jane survived the testator but predeceased Mary, the life tenant. The
court determined that the remainders were vested, not contingent,
and that the interest of Susan and Jane descended to their legal representatives. It was pointed out by the court that a whole series of decisions from earlier times up to the time of the decision had adhered to
this rule.2 2 It was also determined that the words of survivorship in

23
Moore were inserted in the will to prevent a lapse.
24
The majority of New York cases have followed Moore v. Lyons,
though some authority in that state has referred survivorship to the
date of distribution.25 The question now arises as to the present authority of Moore. The court in the Gautiercase did not cite Moore v. Lyons,
nor did it mention any cases adhering to that view. This indicates perhaps that it did not wish to abolish the rule of Moore v. Lyons, but
merely sought to lay down a canon of construction to be followed in
similar cases. The principal case can be harmonized with Moore, since
the rule of the latter was held not to apply in cases where the testator
had expressly manifested his intention to postpone vesting until the
termination of the life estate. Furthermore, the New York courts have
not applied the rule of Moore v. Lyons when certain facts were present. Some of the circumstances which point to a contingent construction are present in the Gautier case. For example, the direction to
"divide and pay over" indicates that the gift is contingent and not
vested; the gift is to a class which cannot be ascertained until the date
of distribution; the gift to the survivors is to be effective only in the
event the life tenant dies without issue. On its facts the principal case
is clearly distinguishable from Moore v. Lyons. In the latter there is a
gift to A for life, with remainder to three named individuals or the
survivors of them; in the Gautier case a life estate is given to A, B, C,
and D, and on the death of any of them there is an alternative gift over
of the remainder of his interest to two classes, neither of which can be
determined until the death of the life tenant.
It is submitted that the testator in the Gautier case created alternative contingent remainders whereby two conditions precedent must
take place before the estate vests in the surviving nephews or nieces.
The first such condition is the death of a nephew or niece without
children, and the second is that the other brothers and sisters must be
living at his or her death. If the New York Court of Appeals had de-

-2Id. at 146.
mId. at 143.
2'33 Am. Jur., Life Estates, Reversions, and Remainders §
=Ibid.

123

(1941).

